Adam Smith als Moralphilosoph Adam Smith as a Moral Philosopher Email: r19@ix.urz.uni-heidelberg.de
siehe unten Rationality, impartiality, universality, relativity, conventionality, motivation: these are key terms frequently appearing in ongoing debates about morality and its foundation. The debates concern the following questions: Do moral reasons for action have any motivational force? Can moral judgments rightly claim any validity beyond the scope of the historically contingent acceptance of the standards they apply? Can morality be founded on impartiality, or is impartiality itself a moral value in need of independent justification? Would universally valid moral principles require an apriori justification? Or, put in a different way, do we, whenever we rely on empirical premises in justifying moral principles, either inevitably minimize their claims to validity, or commit some form of naturalistic fallacy? Today almost everybody admits that a satisfying moral philosophy must acknowledge both the rational and motivational aspects of human nature. Evidently, the influence of affects on human behavior is an empirical matter. But how can that be squared with a non-contingent motivational role of universally valid claims? Any answer to this question will be highly controversial. But it seems that Adam Smith had one based on his conceptions of sympathy and impartiality. Conference Schedule The conference language is English. | |
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